Senior Clinton administration officials called to testify next week before the independent commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks say they are prepared to detail how they repeatedly warned their Bush administration counterparts in late 2000 that Al Qaeda posed the worst security threat facing the nation -- and how the new administration was slow to act.

They said the warnings were delivered in urgent post-election intelligence briefings in December 2000 and January 2001 for Condoleezza Rice, who became Mr. Bush's national security adviser; Stephen Hadley, now Ms. Rice's deputy; and Philip D. Zelikow, a member of the Bush transition team, among others.

"The president and his team received briefings on the threat from Al Qaeda prior to taking office, and fighting terrorism became a top priority when this administration came into office," Sean McCormack, a White House spokesman, said.

Since the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, followed by attacks on U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, and the suicide ramming of the U.S.S. Cole only 11 months before 9/11, there were growing signs, picked up by the CIA, U.S. military intelligence, and their counterparts in Europe and the Middle East, that more such attacks were in the offing. Yet on September 10, 2001 (yes, that's the right date), Attorney General John Ashcroft submitted the final budget request for the Justice Department for fiscal 2003 to Budget Director Mitchell Daniels. Ashcroft dismissed FBI requests for $58 million for 149 new counterterrorism field agents, 200 intelligence analysts, and 54 additional translators. Instead, he proposed reductions in 14 such programs; one was a $65 million cut for state and local governments for counterterrorism equipment, including radios and decontamination suits and training for preparedness.

But in a May 10 letter to department heads setting out the Bush policy agenda, Ashcroft made no mention of terrorism. Among the goals he announced were these: "securing the rights of victims of crimes," "securing the nation's borders and cutting the immigration backlog," "reducing gun violence and drug trafficking" and "reducing overcrowding and drug use in prisons." All should lead to more spending on the increasingly privatized incarceration industry complex. On August 9, a chart entitled "Strategic Plan-Attorney General Priorities" was distributed inside the Justice Department. The same goals were listed, this time with 36 objectives under them, 13 of which were highlighted in yellow as "Highlight-AG Goal." One of the 36 referred to intelligence concerning terrorists; it was not highlighted. According to a former FBI official, Ashcroft's attitude "really undermined a lot of effort to change the culture and mind-set" of FBI agents.

The report is a good start in establishing the historical record. It reads at times like tragedy, at other times almost as farce. The signs were there. Few paid attention. Two, if not more, of the hijackers were within reach of US law enforcement, but nobody saw that. Five days after the attacks, Bush said, "No one could have conceivably imagined suicide bombers burrowing into our society." And in May 2002, Rice said, "I don't think anyone could have predicted these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center." Actually, the report has proof that the attacks of 9/11 were foreseen. Not in terms of date and time. But intelligence reporting indicated and terrorism experts warned that Al Qaeda was interested in mounting precisely these types of attacks. Yet the US government – the Bush II and Clinton administrations – did not prepare adequately. The attacks were far less outside the box than Bush and his aides have suggested. Thwarting them was within the realm of possibility.

One crucial matter is missing from the report: how the White House responded to the intelligence on the Al Qaeda threat. That is because the Administration will not allow the committees to say what information reached Bush. The Administration argued, according to a Congressional source, that to declassify "any description of the president's knowledge" of intelligence reports -- even when the content of those reports have been declassified -- would be a risk to national security. It is difficult to see the danger to the nation that would come from the White House acknowledging whether Bush received any of the information listed above or the other intelligence previously described by the committees. (The latter would include a July 2001 report that said bin Laden was looking to pull off a "spectacular" attack against the United States or US interests designed to inflict "mass casualties." It added, "Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning. They are waiting us out, looking for a vulnerability."

It is unusual -- if not absurd -- for an administration to claim that the state of presidential knowledge is top-secret when the material in question has been made public. But that's what Bush officials have done. Consequently, the public does not know whether these warnings made it to Bush and whether he responded.

A Nice Tight Bombing Pattern

Rumsfeld was saying we needed to bomb Iraq....We all said, 'but no, no. Al Qaeda is in Afghanistan. And Rumsfeld said, 'There aren't any good targets in Afghanistan and there are lots of good targets in Iraq.' I said, 'Well, there are lots of good targets in lots of places, but Iraq had nothing to do with [the September 11 attacks].'"
Former NSC Official Richard Clarke
60 Minutes Interview
March 2004

Colonel Korn gave Major Danby's shoulder a friendly squeeze without changing his unfriendly expression. "Carry on with the briefing Danby. And make sure they understand the importance of a tight bomb pattern."
"Oh, no, Colonel," Major Danby blurted out, blinking upward. "Not for this target. I've told them to space their bombs sixty feet apart so that we'll have a roadblock the full length of the village instead of just in one spot. It will be a much more effective roadblock with a loose bomb pattern."

"We don't care about the roadblock," Colonel Korn informed him. "Colonel Cathcart wants to come out of this mission with a good clean aerial photograph he won't be ashamed to send through channels. Don't forget that General Peckem will be here for the full briefing, and you know how he feels about bomb patterns."

Joseph Heller
Catch-22
1961